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Introduction 
The law of naval warfare is part of the larger bodyoflaw applicable to interna-tional armed conflicts.l Accordingly, it applies to an a rmed conflict between 
two or more States. including conflicts involving State-sponsored forces. 2 Whether 
the law of naval warfare also applies to situations of non -international armed con-
flicts is a contentious issue. Therefore, the distinction between internat ional and 
non-international anned conflicts is important when it comes to the applicability 
of the law of naval war fare to a particular armed conflict. 
Unfortunately, the distinction between international and non-international 
armed conflicts is less clear than it seems at first glance. On the one hand, the " facts 
on the ground" may make it difficult to draw the line of demarcation between the 
two) Additionally, international scholars have taken quite different positions. For 
some, the distinctive criterion is the identity of the parties to the conflict, with the 
issue being whether or not those parties qualify as States under public interna-
tionallaw.4 For others, it is not the identity of the parties alone, but also the geog-
raphy of an armed conflict; they are prepared to apply the law appUcable to 
international armed conflict to any case in which armed conflict "crosses the bor-
ders of the state,"5 even if one of the parties is a non-State actor.6 Still others believe 
that the distinction has become irrelevant, because, they maintain, the fonnerly 
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separate bodies of law have merged into a single body of law applying equally to 
both international and non-international armed conflict.' 
With regard to the alleged merger, it is acknowledged that there has been a 
remarkable development of the law of non-international armed conflict during 
the last decade. Some treaties no longer distinguish between international and 
non-international armed confli cts.6 The concept of war crimes, until recently 
strictly limited to international anned conflicts, has been introduced into the law 
of non-international armed conflict.9 Still, it is doubtful whether that develop-
ment justifies the conclusion that the two bodies of law have merged. First, those 
treaties that do not distinguish between international and non-international 
armed conflict have not become customary international law. Second, one of the 
prime references relied upon by the International Criminal Tribunal for the for-
mer Yugoslavia when addressing international and non-international armed con-
flict issues, the German Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts Manual, is under 
revision. The ftrst edition did not distinguish between the two; however, the forth-
coming second edition will contain a separate section on non-international anned 
conflicts. Third, those who advocate a merger focus on the obligations and prohi-
bitions imposed upon the parties to the conflict. In other words, they maintain 
that in both international and non-international armed conflict the parties are in-
creasingly bound by the same rules, while ignoring the fact that the law of interna-
tional armed conflict offers belligerents certain rights, especially vis-a.-vis the 
nationals of other States (neutrals). This especially holds true for the law of naval 
warfare, which provides for prize measures, blockade and various maritime zones. 
It is doubtful that the proponents of merger would be prepared to accept the exer-
cise of the full spectrum of belligerent rights during a non-international armed 
conflict, even if exercised only by the State actor. 
Those who focus on the identity of the parties to the conflict to determine the 
nature of the conflict are correct insofar as a non-international armed conflict pre-
supposes that at least one party to the armed conflict is a non-State actor. This does 
not mean, however, that geography is irrelevant. To the contrary, according to 
Common Article 3, which appears in each of 1949 Geneva Conventions, the armed 
conflict must occur "in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties."lo Ar-
ticle 1( 1) of 1977 Additional Protocol II applies to "all armed conflicts which take 
place in the terri tory of a High Contracting Party." ]] Hence, it cannot be denied 
that non-international armed conflict is characterized by a terri torial element. 
Those who take the position that an international armed conflict comes into ex-
istence as soon as there is a trans-border element seem to base that position on a li t-
eral reading of the provisions of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol I I. 
However, mere "spillover effects" into the territory of another State do not 
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necessarily change the character of a non-international armed conflict into that of 
an international armed conflict as long as the governments concerned refrain from 
hostilities against each other. II 
Differences of opinion on how to characterize a conflict increase if the situation 
under scrutiny does not easily fit into one of the traditional categories, as, for in-
stance, the armed conflicts in Gaza and in Afghanistan/Pakistan. Very often the 
different approaches to distinguishing international from non-international 
armed conflicts seem to be guided by desired result rather than by a sober analysis 
of customary international law. Although the different characterization ap-
proaches are interesting, this article is not designed to provide further criteria of 
distinction nor to add yet another category of armed conflict to the existing catego-
ries of international and non-international. It starts, therefore, with the premise 
that the law of international armed conflict applies 
• "whenever there is a resort to armed force between States";i3 
• if the non-State actors in a non-international armed conflict obtain recogni-
tion of belligerency by the government;14 or 
• for States parties to Additional Protocol 1,15 if the conditions of Article l ( 4) 
are fulfilled. 
In those armed conflicts the law of naval warfare undoubtedly applies, at least 
insofar as measures taken by the State party to the conflict are concerned. The non-
State party to the conflict may also apply methods and means of naval warfare 
against its State enemy. However, the non -State actor may not interfere with neu-
tral shipping unless the neutral State has--either explicitly or implicitly-recog-
nized it as a belligerent. 
A non-international armed conflict exists whenever there is "protracted armed 
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or be-
tween such groups within a State."16The focus of the present article is on the ques-
tion of whether, and to what extent, the parties to a non-international armed 
conflict are entitled to exercise belligerent rights under the law of naval warfare. 
The first part gives a short overview of nations' practice involving the use of meth-
ods and means of naval warfare during non-international armed conflicts. The sec-
ond part addresses the question of a geographical limitation of the hostilities. The 
third part deals with the conduct of hostilities and the fourth part discusses mea-
sures taken by the parties to the conflict that interfere with the shipping and/or avi-
ation of other States. It will be shown that the law of naval warfare can be applied to 
non -international armed conflicts, albeit partly modified, between the parties to 
the conflict. If, however, the parties interfere with the shipping and/or aviation of 
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other States beyond the outer limit of the State party's territorial sea or contiguous 
zone, an additional legal basis for the measures in question must be fo und. 
Part 1. Practice 
A. American Civil War 
The blockade during the American Civil War is an important example of applying 
the law of naval warfare to a non-international armed conflict. It m ust be borne in 
mind, however, that the declaration of the blockade by President Abraham Lincoln 
was considered as recognition ofbelligerency,17 thus triggering the applicability of 
the law of blockade and of the law of naval warfare. Moreover, the British gov-
ernment had proclaimed its neutrality, thus also recognizing a state ofbelliger-
ency between the United States and the Confederate States. IS Accordingly, the 
blockade ofthe American Civil War serves as a precedent only in a limited manner 
for the general applicability either of the law of blockade or of the law of naval war-
fare to non-international armed conflicts. Nevertheless, it needs to be emphasized 
that, although recognition of belligerency has occurred only infrequently in recent 
State practice, it continues to exist as a legal concept.19 Moreover, as illustrated by 
the blockade of the Confederate States, recognition of belligerency may be explicit 
or implicit. 
B. Spanish Civil War 
During the Spanish Civil War ( 1936-39) a nwnber of merchant vessels of various 
nationalities supplying the government forces were attacked by aircraft and 
submarines. The identity of the State or group to which the attacking aircraft and 
submarines belonged is uncertain; however, it is dear that it was not a party to the 
conflict.20 In response, nine States, ind uding the United Kingdom and France, 
concluded the 1937 Nyon agreements21 and decided on collective measures against 
submarines, surface vessels and aircraft that were, or that were suspected of being, 
engaged in unlawful attacks against merchant vessels. For the purposes of the pres-
ent paper, the treatment of those attacks as "acts of piracy" is unimportant. It 
should be noted, however, that the parties to the Nyon Arrangement in the pream-
ble emphasized that they were not "in any way admitting the right of either party to 
the conflict in Spain to exercise belligerent rights or to interfere with merchant 
ships on the high seas even if the laws of warfare at sea are observed." Therefore, it 
is probably correct to state that "despite the scale of hostilities involved and the de-
gree of international intervention on both sides ... , no European state conceded to 




Both prior to and during the conflict between France and Algerian groups seeking 
independence, France instituted an extensive maritime control zone in the Medi-
terranean. Acting under a decree of March 17, 1956,23 the French Navy intercepted 
more than 2,500 ships per year24 in an effort to prevent the flow of arms to rebels in 
Algeria.25 According to Articles 4 and 5 of that decree, vessels of less than one hundred 
tons were liable to visit and search inside the "customs zone" that extended fifty 
kilometers off the Algerian coast.26 After 1958, vessels of more than one hundred 
tons were also subjected to visi t and search. Whereas most of the measures were 
taken within fifty kilometers of the Algerian coast, a number of vessels were visited 
well beyond the "customs zone."27 Vessels were diverted when boarding was im-
possible due to adverse weather conditions or the nature of the cargo, including 
cargo consisting of arms and explosives. In the latter case, the cargo was confis-
cated unless it was determined that the arms and/or explosives were not to be used 
in a manner that constituted a danger to French forces in Algeria.28 In most in-
stances, the ships were released. The French measures that met sharp protests of 
the affected flag States were justified by reference to the rights of self-defense and 
self-preservation.29 
D. Sri lanka 
The armed conflict in Sri Lanka (1983-2009) was characterized by a considerable 
naval element. The "Sea Tigers"-the naval wing, which was established in 1984, of 
the Tamil Tigers-proved to be a serious threat to government forces . According 
to unconfirmed reports, the Sea Tigers deployed small suicide boats and fast patrol 
boats that sank twenty-nine government fast patrol boats and attacked naval bases 
of the Sri Lankan Navy. The Sea Tigers did not limit their operations to enemy 
forces, but also interfered with innocent shipping in the Indian Ocean. As a result, 
on May 14, 2007, the Indian Navy announced that it would increase its presence in 
the Palk Strait and deploy unmanned aerial vehicles in the region. )O 
In December 2004, demands were made in India to neutralize the Sea Tigers be-
cause they had become a "credible third naval force in the southern part of South 
Asia."3] In 1984 and again in 2009, the Sri Lankan government forces were alleged 
to have established naval blockades against parts of the coastline controlled by the 
Tamil Tigers. However, those references to naval blockade are misleading. The 
measures taken by the government forces in 1984 were indeed aimed at preventing 
entry and exit to and from the coastal area, but their main purpose was to prevent 
the Tamil Tigers from receiving both training and equipment from the southern 
Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Additionally, the maritime interdiction operations oc-
curred within the Sri Lankan territorial sea and contiguous zone, and were directed 
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against vessels suspected of being engaged in smuggling weapons or supplies to the 
Tamil Tigers. The Sri Lankan government did not assert the right to interfere with 
all neutral vessels encountered in high seas areas. n The so-called "blockade" of the 
Mullaitivu coast in 2009 was part of a major mili tary operation against the head-
quarters of the Sea Tigers that eventually resulted in its neutralization. Again, the 
Sri Lankan armed forces did not claim any right to interfere with neutral shipping. 
E. Gaza 
On August 13, 2008, the Shipping Authority at the Israeli Ministry of Transport 
published a Notice to Mariners calling upon shipping to refrain from entering the 
terri torial waters off the Gaza coast}3 That measure was considered inadequate, 
and was followed on January 3, 2009 by a Minister of Defense-ordered naval 
blockade of the coast of the Gaza Strip that extended to a maximum distance of 
twenty nautical miles from the coast. The Notice to Mariners advising of the estab-
lishment of the blockade provided: "All mariners are advised that as of 03 January 
2009,1700 UTC, Gaza maritime area is closed to all maritime traffic and is under 
blockade imposed by Israeli Navy until further notice. Maritime Gaza area is en-
closed by the following coordinates. . .".34 The notice was published on the 
websites of the Israel Defense Force, the Shipping and Ports Authority and the 
Ministry of Transport, and on several standard international channels, such as 
NA VTEX, an international satellite network that collects and distrib utes notices to 
vessels worldwide. Moreover, this notice was b roadcast twice a day on the emer-
gency channel for maritime communications to vessels that sailed within three 
hundred kilometers of the Israeli coast. On May 31, 2010, the so-called "Gaza 00-
tilla," including the Mavi Marmara, was intercepted.35 
F. Libya 
The 20 11 con flict in Libya was a "mixed" con nict. On one hand, it was a non-
international armed conflict between the government forces loyal to Gaddafi and 
the rebels. On the other hand, it was an international armed conflict between 
Libya and the international alliance that exercised certain belligerent rights on the 
basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 .36 For the purposes of this article, it 
is irrelevant whether the measures taken by the alliance were in compliance with 
the terms of the resolution. During the conflict, NATO warships intercepted sev-
eral boats operated by Gaddafi forces that were laying anti-shipping mines outside 
the harbor of Misurata, a city that was dependent for much of its food and supplies 
on the sea link with the rebel capital Benghazi. British Brigadier Rob Weighill, di-
rector of NATO operations in Libya, condemned the minelaying by stating: "We 
have just seen Gaddafi forces floating anti-ship mines outside Misurata harbour 
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today. It again shows his complete disregard for international law and his willing-
ness to attack humanitarian delivery efforts."37 
Part II. Region of Operations 
A. Internal Waters and Territorial Sea 
As non-international armed conflicts occur within a State,}8 the parties to the con-
flict are not prohibited from conducting hostilities in that State's internal waters 
and territorial sea, as those are defined by the law of the sea. As long as the parties to 
the conflict do not interfere with the navigation of other States, they may apply 
methods and means of naval warfare against their adversary in those sea areas. 
At the same time, however, other States continue to enjoy the right of innocent 
passage. There is no indication in either treaty law or State practice that the right 
of innocent passage is automatically suspended at the commencement of a non-
international armed conflict. Rather, the general rules continue to apply. The 
coastal State, under Article 25(3) ofthe 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (LOS Convention),39 may in certain circumstances temporarily 
suspend innocent passage in specified parts of its territorial sea. To be effective, 
the suspension must be "duly published." 
The reference to "weapons exercises" in Article 25(3) as a basis fo r suspending 
the right of innocent passage is not the exclusive circumstance in which suspension 
may occur. The article goes on to indicate that suspension may occur when "essen-
tial for the protection of its [the coastal State'sl security." In determining whether 
such suspension is essential, the coastal State enjoys a wide margin of discretion.4o 
The existence of a non-international anned conflict certainly constitutes a threat to 
the coastal State's security; hence, the authorities of the coastal State are entitled to 
suspend the right of innocent passage in order to prevent foreign shipping from 
navigating in close vicinity to the conflict area. In view of a lack of conclusive State 
practice, it is unclear whether innocent passage may be suspended in the entire ter-
ritorial sea. While suspension in a State's entire territorial sea would appear to be 
inconsistent with Article 25(3)'s "in specified areas," the circumstances of a given 
non-international armed conflict may be such that the government considers it 
necessary to close the entire territorial sea to foreign navigation. If, however, the 
armed hostilities are limited to a certain region, it would be difficult for the 
government to justify a suspension of the right of innocent passage in coastal sea 
areas remote from the area of operations. 
The non-State party to a non -international armed conflict is not entitled to sus-
pend or otherwise interfere with the right of innocent passage. This clearly follows 
from the wording of Article 25(3) ("The coastal State may .. . ").41 If the non-State 
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party nevertheless takes measures affecting foreign shipping, the authorities of the 
coastal State under Article 24(2) must "give appropriate publicity to any danger to 
navigation, of which it has knowledge, within its terri torial sea. "42 The government 
is not obligated to actively take measures with a view to protecting foreign naviga-
tion against interference by the non-State party to the conflict. 
B. International Straits and Archipelagic Sea Lanes 
Neither the government nor, a fortiori, the non-State party to a non-international 
armed conflict is entitled to interfere with the rights of transit passage and of 
archipelagic sea lanes passage within international straits and archipelagic waters. 
Even during an international armed conflict the belligerents are obliged to preserve 
those passage rightS.43 There is no indication in State practice that the existence of a 
non-international armed conflict would entitle the government to adopt laws and 
regulations relating to passage that are in excess of that permissible under the law of 
the sea. In particular, there maybe no suspension of transit passage even if the exer-
cise of navigation or overflight were dangerous to the transiting vessel or aircraft. 
As is the case with dangers to navigation within the territorial sea, the authorities of 
the States bordering an international strait and the archipelagic State are obliged to 
give "appropriate publicity to any danger to navigation or overOight."44 And, 
again, the government is not obliged to take active measures against the non-State 
party to the conflict in order to protect international navigation and aviation. 
C. Sea Areas beyond the Territorial Sea 
The government of the State concerned is entitled to exercise maritime interdic-
tionlinterception operations within its contiguous zone if the conditions of Article 
3345 of the LOS Convention are met. Hence, the "special naval surveillance zone" 
established and enforced by Sri Lankan government forces in 1984 and the mea-
sures taken against foreign vessels that were engaged in smuggling weapons and 
supplies to the Tamil Tigers were "justified under ordinary customs and policing 
powers available within 24 nautical miles of Sri Lanka's baselines."46 
State practice seems to provide sufficient evidence that there is no rule of custom-
ary international law prohibiting the parties to a non-international armed conflict 
from engaging in hostilities against each other in high seas areas. As in an interna-
tional armed conflict, there is, however, a positive obligation to pay due regard fo r 
the rights enjoyed by other States.47 Moreover, the parties are prohibited from 
damaging submarine cables and pipelines that do not exclusively serve either party 
to the conflict.# 
Hostile actions taken within the exclusive economic zone or on the continental 
shelf of another State during a non-international conflict are more questionable. 
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While the law of international armed conflict contains no prohibition on con-
ducting hostilities in those areas,49 it is doubtful whether this also holds true for 
non-international armed conflicts. In view of a lack of conclusive practice, it is not 
possible to reach a clear conclusion on that issue. It is, however, safe to state that 
measures taken by a non-State party to a non-international armed conflict within 
the exclusive economic zone or on the continental shelf of another State will, in all 
likelihood, not be tolerated by that State. This certainly will be the case if either 
party to the conflict decides to lay naval mines in those areas. If such minelaying 
occurs, the coastal State is entitled to remove or otherwise neutralize the mines. 
Part 111. Conduct of Naval Hostilities 
This section addresses only relations between the parties to a non-international 
armed conflict, and not their relations with non-parties. Its object is to determine 
which rules of the law of naval warfare are applicable in a non- international armed 
conflict by focusing on the rules and principles applicable to the methods and 
means of naval warfare . 
A. Entitlement 
Under the law of international armed conflict, only warships are entitled to 
exercise belligerent rights.so Th is rule goes back to the proh ibition of privateering 
under the 1856 Paris Declaration.51 Warships are those vessels that meet the crite-
ria set forth in Articles 2-5 of the 1907 Hague Convention VII ,52 Article 8(2) of the 
1958 High Seas ConventionS3 and Article 29 of the LOS Convention. 54 Limitations 
on the exercise of belligerent rights are most important with regard to interference 
with neutral navigation and aviation; thus, neutral vessels and aircraft must accede 
to such interference only if the measures are taken by warships. 
No such limitation applies to non-international anned conflicts vis-a-vis the 
parties.55 It follows from the object and purpose of the rule limiting the exercise of 
belligerent rights under the law of naval warfare-Le., the transparent ent itlement 
of the warship---that the non-State actor will obviously not have ships that meet 
the criteria for classification as a warship since one of the cr iteria is that it be a State 
vessel. The government forces may make use of any vessel or aircraft , including, fo r 
example, those used fo r law enforcement and customs enforcement, in the con-
duct of hostilities. This may not be the case, however, if the government takes mea-
sures against foreign shipping. 1 will return to that issue. 56 
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B. Lawful Targets 
Under the international law of non-international anned conflict, members of the 
regular armed forces, dissident armed forces and an organized armed group 
formed by the non-State party to a non-international armed conflict are lawful tar-
gets.57The International Committee of the Red Cross's ( ICRe's) Interpretive Guid-
ance on the Notion of Dired Participation in Hostilities under Intertlarional 
Humanitarian Law provides that members of organized armed groups "consist 
only of individuals whose continuous function is to take a direct part in hostilities 
('continuous combat function')."58 The Interpretive Guidance provides that "con-
tinuous combat function" "requires lasting integration into an organized armed 
group acting as the armed forces of a non-State party to an armed conflict."s9 Per-
sons that accompany or support an organized armed group but "who assume ex-
clusively political, administrative or other non-combat functions" are civilians 
who have "protection against direct attack unless and for such time as they directly 
participate in hostilities."60 Members ofthe regular armed forces, however, regard-
less of the function they serve] are not considered to be civilians and are subject to 
direct attack. This introduction of a double standard is not practicable in the con-
text of armed conflicts. It would have been preferable had the Interpretive Guidance 
accepted the conclusion of the ICRe's Customary Intertlational Humanitarian Law 
study which rightly states, "Such imbalance would not exist if members of orga-
nized armed groups were, due to their membership, either considered to be con-
tinuously taking a direct part in the hostilities or not considered to be civilians. "62 
In the context of the Libyan conflict, the Libyan rebels were lawful targets at that 
point when the rebellion against the Gaddafi government passed the threshold to 
become a non-international armed conflict. They were not protected under Secu-
rity Council Resolution 1973, which afforded protection to civilians, but not to 
members of organized armed groups. Civilians, more generally under the law of 
non-international armed conflict, are not subject to direct attack unless (and for 
such time as) they take a direct part in hostilities.61Thus, civilians, who would oth-
erwise have been entitled to protection, who directly participated in the hostilities 
by attacking either the Gaddafi or the rebel forces became lawful targets during 
their period of participation as well. 
When it comes to objects-which are, of course, the focus of naval operations-
it is generally agreed that the definition set forth in Article 52(2) of Additional 
Protocol I is customary in character and thus applies to both international and 
non-international armed conflicts.64 All objects that have an "intrinsic military sig-
nificance" are to be considered lawful military objectives "by nature."65 Hence, the 
military equipment, such as fast patrol boats and ammunition depots, or military 
headquarters of either party may be attacked at all times. For instance, the vessels 
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used by the Sea Tigers for naval operations, as well as their stronghold in 
Mullaitivu, were lawful targets. The same holds true for the military equipment of 
the Sri Lankan government forces .66 All other objects, al though of a civilian nature, 
may become lawful military objectives by either their use, purpose or location. 
It follows from the foregoing that civilians and civilian objects may not be di-
rectly attacked.67 Moreover, the parties to a non-international armed confli ct are 
obliged to always distinguish between members of armed forces or organized 
armed groups and civilians, and between military objectives and civilian objects.68 
Civilians are those who are neither members of an organized anned group nor 
directly participating in the hostilities.69 Civilian objects are objects that do not 
constitute a military objective under the customary international law definition. 70 
In a non-international armed conflict, it may be difficult to d early establish 
whether an individual is a member of an organized armed group or a civilian or 
whether an object constitutes a military objective or a civilian object. For instance, 
the parties are under no obligation to use vehicles that are marked or otherwise 
clearly identifiable as military in nature. This does not render the rules on lawful 
targets and the principle of distinction obsolete; it simply increases the difficulty in 
applying them. 
C. Use of Naval Mines 
As was seen in the Libyan conflict, the use of naval mines by the forces loyal to 
Gaddafi was condemned as being in "complete disregard for internationallaw."71 
That statement, however, referred to interference with "humanitarian delivery 
efforts"; Resolution 1973 required Libyan authorities to " take all measures to pro-
tect civilians and meet their basic needs, and to ensure the rapid and unimpeded 
passage of h umanitarian assistance."72 In the absence of Resolution 1973, it would 
have been difficult to condem n the laying of naval mines as a violation ofinterna-
tional law or of the law of non-international armed conflict had Libyan authori ties 
publicized their employment. The mines were laid within the Libyan territorial sea 
and their purpose seems to have been to prevent supplies from reaching Misurata 
via the sea. Such conduct does not violate the law applicable to non-international 
armed conflict. Moreover, it would be difficult to conclude that the laying of naval 
mines violated the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks or any specific prohibition 
under the law applicable to such weapons or their use. 
The fact that the mines were laid within the Libyan territorial sea is not alone 
sufficient to determine that the establishment of the minefield accorded with the 
applicable international law, however. A minefield certainly impedes upon the 
right of innocent passage. As was seen earlier, any suspension of the r ight of inno-
cent passage requires prior notification, e.g., by issuing a Notice to Mariners.73 
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Libyan authorities neither publicly announced the laying of mines nor issued a 
warning to international shipping. Even if the mines were not directed against the 
effort to deliver humanitarian supplies, but were employed merely as a method of 
naval warfare applied against the rebels, the minelaying was still unlawful because 
it was conducted in disregard of the right of innocent passage of other States. 
The law of non-international armed conflict does not prohibit the laying of na-
val mines in the internal waters or in the terri torial sea of the State. The law recog-
nizes that naval mines serve legitimate purposes, to include area denial, coastal 
defense and maintaining and enforcing a blockade?' Of course, indiscriminate at-
tacks, i.e., "attacks that are not specifically directed" against lawful targets,75 the use 
of weapons that are indiscriminate by nature16 and the indiscriminate use of weap-
ons11 are prohibited both in international and in non-international armed conflict. 
The fact that naval mines may equally hazard military objectives and civilian objects 
is not sufficient in itself to conclude that the laying of mines is in violation of any of 
these prohibitions. Moreover, the law of naval mine warfare contains a specific rule 
on indiscriminate attacks, by explicitly prohibiting the use of "free-floating mines, 
unless they are directed against a military objective and they become harmless 
within an hour after loss of control over them."18 
IfMisurata had constituted a rebel stronghold, it would have been lawful to cut 
it off from outside resupply. However, the laying of naval mines by the Gaddafi 
forces was illegal because it occurred in disregard of the obligation to take all feasi-
ble precautions fo r the safety of peaceful shipping19 (the fa ilure to provide notifi-
cation to the international comm unity) and of the obligation to provide for 
humanitarian relief consignments. With regard to relief consignments, the parties 
to an armed conflict are obliged to provide for their free passage if the civilian 
population is "inadequately provided with food and other objects essential for its 
survival."8(/ While this obligation originated in the law of blockade it is, I would as-
sert, customary in character as a specification of the principle of humanity. 
In conclusion, the use of naval mines in non-international armed conflict nei-
ther is expressly prohibited nor ab initio violates the principle of distinction or the 
rules of the law of non-international armed confli ct prohibiting indiscriminate at-
tacks. It must be borne in mind, however, that this is true only if naval mines are 
laid within the internal waters or, subject to prior notification, the territorial sea of 
the State. In sea areas beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea, naval mines may 
be used by the parties to a non-international armed conflict only if they are di-
rected against a military objective. 
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D. The Natural Environment 
The Customary In ternational Humanitarian Lawstudy states that "[iJt can be argued 
that the obligation to pay due regard to the environment [in international armed 
conflicts J also applies in non-international armed conflict if there are effects in an-
other State."81 Although the arguments are based on the law of peace, i.e., interna-
tional environmental law, this may be a correct statement of the law because there 
is no rule of general international law that would absolve a State of its obligations 
vis-a.-vis other States under either general international law or international envi-
ronmentallaw merely because that State has become a party to a non-international 
armed conflict. 
Unfortunately, the study fails to be sufficiently dear as to who is bound by the 
obligation to pay due regard. The commentary only refers to obligations of States; 
it does not clarify whether non-State actors are also bound by it. The failure to 
indicate that non-State actors are bound may be correct, because there are good 
reasons to assume that the obligations under international environmental law ex-
clusively apply to States as subjects of international law. 
Far more interesting than the reference to the obligation to pay due regard to the 
natural environment beyond the territory of the State is the following conclusion 
by the leRC: 
[Tlhere are indications that this customary rule [i.e., the duty to pay due regard] may 
also apply to parties' behaviour within the State where the armed conflict is taking 
place. Some support for drafting a treaty rule for this purpose existed during the nego-
tiation of Additional Protocol II. It was not adopted then, but the general acceptance of 
the applicability of international humanitarian law to non-international armed con-
flicts has considerably strengthened since 1977. In addition, many environmental law 
treaties apply to a State's behaviour within its own territory. There is also a certain 
amount of State practice indicating the obligation to protect the environment thaI ap-
plies also to non-international armed conflicts, including military manuals, official 
statements and the many submissions by States to the International Court oOustice in 
the Nuclear Weapons case to the effect that the environment must be protected for the 
benefit of all.112 
It is to be noted that this statement is characterized by cautious formulations-
"indications," "may also apply," "some support," "certain amount of State prac-
tice" -that indicate that the authors of the study are less than convinced of the cor-
rectness of their assumptions. In any event, those formulations do not distract 
from the suggestion that the authors were guided by their poli tical and ecological 
aspirations, rather than by a sound analysis of State practice. State practice during 
non-international armed conllicts does not provide sufficient evidence to 
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determine that the parties to the conflict are obliged to take into consideration---or 
to pay due regard to-the natural environment of the State in which the conflict is 
occurring. 
It should also be noted that there still is no generally accepted definition of the 
term "natural environment. "83 But even if there were agreement that. for example. 
certain sea areas or marine living resources constitute "natural environment," this 
would not have an impact on the lawfulness of naval operations during a non-
international armed conflict that have, or may have, detrimental effects on the 
marine environment of the State concerned. 
Part N . Interference with the Navigation of Other States 
The law of non-international armed conflict contains no prohibitions going be-
yond those applying to land or air operations with regard to naval operations of the 
parties that occur within the internal waters and the territorial sea of the State party 
to the conflict so long as they do not interfere with the navigation of other States. 
State practice during the Spanish Civil War and the Algerian conflict seems to 
provide convincing evidence that the parties to a non-international armed conflict 
are not allowed to interfere with the navigation of other States in sea areas beyond 
the outer limit of the territorial sea (unless such measures are lawful under the law 
of the sea or general international law). This finding is certainly correct as concerns 
measures taken by non-State actors. As regards interference by government forces 
one author has taken the position that 
the right of states to implement measures against neutral vessels in NIACs is thus at 
best an unsettled question. The most one can say is that in higher-intensity conflicts 
states have sometimes acknowledged or acquiesced in blockades targeting non-state 
actors .... However, in equally violent conflicts such a right has sometimes not been rec-
ognised and attempts to assert rights of blockade or similar measures have been pro-
tested (for instance, the Spanish Civil War and the Algerian rebellion). Where such 
measures are protested as contrary to international law those protests must weigh 
against the conclusion that there is opinio juris supporting the rule of custom invoked. 
On the basis of relevant state practice one can at most hazard a suggestion that irrespec-
tive of the preciseelassification of a conflict, states are likely to tolerate the assertion of a 
blockade only in cases of higher-intensity conflicts on a par with the traditional under-
standing of war."14 
A. Neutral Vessels and Aircraft as Lawful Targets 
It must be emphasized that the doubts expressed with regard to the authority of the 
State party to a non-international armed conflict to interfere with neutral vessels 
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and aircraft have only concerned measures short of attack, i.e., visit, search and 
capture, and blockade. To date there has been no study addressing the question of 
whether foreign vessels and aircraft may qualify as lawful targets under the law of 
non-international armed conflict. 
If the definition oflawful military objectives in an international armed conflict 
also applies in non-international armed conflict,8S there is no convincing reason 
that would justify its limitation to vessels and aircraft of the nationality of the State 
concerned. Accordingly, any vessel, regardless of the flag it is flying, and any air-
craft, wherever registered, used by an organized armed group in the course of a 
non-international armed conflict for military purposes constitute lawful military 
objectives by either their nature or use. If, for instance, another State comes to the 
assistance of the government forces, the warships and military aircraft deployed by 
that State will qualify as lawful military objectives by their nature. If the govern-
ment of the State party makes use of vessels operated by a private military/security 
company that flies the flag of another State, that vessel will be a lawful target by rea-
son of its use. In such cases, it does not make a difference whether the vessel or air-
craft is encountered in the territorial sea or national airspace or in sea areas beyond 
the outer limit of the territorial sea or in international airspace. It is unimaginable 
that the parties to a non-international armed conflict will refrain from attacking 
such vessels or aircraft simply because they have departed the territorial sea or 
national airspace. It is equally unimaginable that other States will protest attacks on 
such vessels and aircraft on the sole basis of the attacks' occurring on the high seas 
or in international airspace. 
The correctness of these findings cannot be questioned even in view of the prac-
tice of States during the Spanish Civil War, during which the parties to the 1937 
Nyon agreement were not prepared to recognize a right of the parties to that 
armed conflict "to exercise belligerent rights orto interfere with merchant ships on 
the high sea even if the laws of warfare at sea are observed. "86 The fact that those 
States were not prepared to recognize the exercise of belligerent rights, including 
attacks on neutral merchant vessels qualifying as lawful targets, does not mean that 
the law of non-international armed conflict is the same today. While the law as it 
stood in 1937 may have contained a prohibition preventing the parties to a non-
international armed conflict from exercising belligerent rights on the high seas, 
this is no longer the case under the contemporary law of non-international armed 
conflict. The customary definition of lawful military objectives contains no excep-
tions for objects that have the nationality of foreign States. 
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B. Visit, Search and Capture 
The interceptions of foreign vessels conducted by the French Navy during the Al-
gerian conflict met strong resistance from affected flag States. France, however, was 
less than impressed and continued to intercept fo reign merchant vessels for years. 
O'Connell rightly observes that since the nineteenth century there had not 
been such an extensive invasion- for security reasonS---Qf the principle of the freedom 
of the seas as in the case of the Algerian operation. The large number of ships affected, 
and the large number of countries which became diplomatically involved, would have 
led one to imagine that more attention would have been paid to this situation. Since 
only a few ships had their cargoes removed, and those ships were dearly engaged in the 
smuggling of arms into Algeria, the operation did not seriously affect the navigation of 
the high sea, and this, together with the political situation prevailing, would seem to ex-
plain the reticence on the part ofllag States of the ships affected with respect to demands 
of the French government. The fact that France was able for so long and in so extensive a 
manner to exercise naval power on the high seas on the ground of self-defence causes one 
to ponder on the extent to which a conselVative appreciation of international law has a 
role in defence planning. 111 
There is also the question of the Israeli blockade of Gaza. As will be discussed in 
Part IV.C, it is the view of this author that the conflict should be classified as an in-
ternational armed conflict. However, it is also useful to consider what the legal po-
sition would have been ifit were considered to be non-international in nature, as it 
is by some scholars. 
Beginning in 2008, and continuing until the establishment of the blockade of 
the Gaza Strip on January 3, 2009, Israel exercised the right of visit and search in 
order to prevent the flow of arms into the Gaza Strip. The few measures taken 
against foreign vessels that were suspected, upon reasonable grounds, of being en-
gaged in the transportation of arms destined for Hamas did not give rise to strong 
protests. Either the flag States implicitly recognized Israel's security interests or 
they simply did not want to admit that ships flying their flags had been engaged in 
the smuggling of arms and ammunition. Whatever the rationale, there is a clear 
parallel to the Algerian operation insofar as security interests and the right of self-
defense may serve as a justification for interference with foreign shipping by the 
State party to a non-international armed conflict. 
Both the Algerian and Gaza conflicts seem to justify the conclusion that the State 
party to a non-international armed conflict-not the non-State actor-is entitled 
to intercept foreign vessels on the high seas if the following conditions are met: 
(1) vital security interests of the State are at stake; 
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(2) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the foreign vessels are en-
gaged in activities jeopardizing those security interests (e.g., by supplying 
the non-State party with arms); and 
(3) the measures are undertaken in close proximity to the conflict area. 
It must be emphasized that the recognition of the right of interception (visit, 
search and capture) does not imply recognition of the r ight to exercise measures 
short of attack under prize law. Prize law stricto sensu only applies in international 
armed conflicts. Rather, the legal basis is found in the right of self-defense or in the 
customary right of self-preservation in order to protect the territorial and political 
integrity of the State. This right is equally exercisable in an international or non-
international anned conflict. The finding by the International Court of Justice in 
the Wall advisory opinion that the right of self-defense does not apply if there is no 
trans-border element88 has no basis in State practice. 
C. Blockade: The Gaza Case 
J. General Considerations 
Unaddressed thus far is the question of whether the parties to a non-international 
armed conflict are entitled to establish and enforce a naval or aerial blockade. 
Blockades are, by necessity, established in international waters or international 
airspace, apply to all vessels or aircraft regardless of their nationality,89 and are dis-
tinguished from more limited actions such as measures undertaken with the objec-
tive of preventing exit from or entry into a given part of the coast or a port 
controlled by the other party to a non-international armed conflict. These latter 
measures do not qualify as a blockade under the law of anned conflict as long as 
they are limited to the territorial sea of the State, or are not applied against foreign 
vessels or aircraft. 
As noted previously in the context of the American Civil War, it may be the 
declaration of a blockade by the government as an implicit recognition ofbelliger-
ency of the non-State party to the conflict that triggers the applicability of the law 
of international armed conflict and, thus, of the law of naval warfare.90 
If, however, the declaration of blockade cannot be understood as an implicit 
recognition of belligerency --either because the concept is no longer recogn ized 
as being part of the lex lata or because the circumstances surrounding the decla-
ration do not justify a conclusion to that effect-it is doubtful whether the State 
party to a non-international armed conflict is entitled to establish and enforce a 
blockade. One author who classifies the conflict between Israel and Hamas as a 
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non-international armed conflict has come to the conclusion that in view of the 
sporadic, on-again, off-again nature of the hostilities, "Israel had no right to im-
pose a blockade on the Gaza Strip and its enforcement of that unlawful blockade 
against the flotill a ... was an act incurring state responsibility.''91 According to that 
author's view, "there is no consistent state practice and opinio juris suggesting 
blockade is available outside an [international armed conflict J."92 While that 
writer's opinion of the legality of the Israeli blockade is not shared by this author, it 
is a correct statement of the contemporary law that, absent recognition ofbelliger-
ency, the parties to a non-international armed confli ct are not entitled to establish 
and enforce a naval or aerial blockade against foreign vessels or aircraft. 
2. The Gaza Case 
The legal classification of the Gaza conflict is a contested issue. Those international 
lawyers who deal with the subject in a serious manner93 and hold that Israel's 
blockade of the Gaza Strip is illegal arrive at that conclusion because they charac-
terize the conflict as a non-international armed conflict.94 Even if that characteriza-
tion is correct, their finding that the blockade is therefore unlawful does not 
necessarily follow, because recognition of belligerency continues to be a valid con-
cept. The mere fact that a given rule or concept of international law has not been 
made use of for an extended period does not mean that the rule or concept has be-
come void by reason of desuetude. 95 There is no evidence that States, by refraining 
from recognizing a status of belligerency, have abolished that concept for good. 
Rather, States are unwilling to bring into operation the legal consequences that 
flow from a recognition of belligerency , but by the very study of the consequences 
they acknowledge that the concept is alive and well. 
However, while this author accepts that others have reached a contrary position, 
the Gaza conflict cannot be classified as a non-international armed conflict. There 
are convincing reasons to conclude that it is an international armed conflict in view 
of the continuing belligerent occupation.96 The Supreme Court of Israel does not 
share this opinion, because, according to the Court, Israel, since the 2005 disen-
gagement, no longer exercises effective control over the Gaza Strip.97 The Court, 
however, takes the position that international hwnanitarian law applies to an 
armed conflict between Israel and terrorist organizations not merely in an area that 
is subject to occupation, but "in any case of an armed conflict of an international 
character-in other words, one that crosses the borders of the state -whether or 
not the place in which the armed conflict occurs is subject to a belligerent occupa-
tion."98 Thus the Court reaches the same conclusion, albeit by a different route 
than belligerent occupation. 
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The Turkel Commission, which was established by the Israeli government to 
examine the circumstances surrounding the boarding of the Mavi Marmara on 
May 31, 2010, concurred with the Supreme Court that the conflict in the Gaza 
St rip is "international in character."99 Additionally, the Commission took into 
consideration (1) the degree of de facto control that Hamas exercises over the 
Gaza Strip, (2) the significant security threat that Hamas presents, and (3) 
Hamas's attempts to import weapons, ammunition and other military supplies by sea. 
The Commission then cond uded that it "would have considered applying the 
rules governing the imposition and enforcement of a naval blockade even if the con-
flict between Israel and the Gaza Strip had been dassified as a non-international 
armed conflict. "1(10 
The Palmer Report, which was prepared by the panel appointed by the UN 
Secretary-General to examine the boarding of the Mavi Mamlara, also conduded 
that the conflict was international in nature, stating: 
The Panel considers the confiict should be treated as an international one for the purposes 
of the law of blockade. This takes foremost into account Israel's right to self-defence 
against armed attacks from outside its territory. In this context, the debate on Gaza's 
status, in particular its relationship to Israel, should not obscure the realities. The law 
does not operate in a political vacuum, and it is implausible to deny that the nature of 
the armed violence between Israel and Hamas goes beyond purely domestic matters. In 
fact, it has all the trappings of an international armed conflict. wI 
The findings of the Turkel Commission and the Secretary-General's panel lend 
further support to the government of Israel's determination that it was enti tled to 
establish the naval blockade. 
A naval blockade is a lawful method of naval warfare . 102 As such, it overrides the 
peacetime right of all States to freely navigate in the high seas areas covered by the 
blockade. ,03 The blockading power is not only entitled to prevent vessels from either 
entering or leaving the blockaded area, but, in fact, has an obligation to achieve that 
goal by ensuring the blockade is effective.,1}4 The blockading power must use what-
ever means it has available to prevent entry and exit of all vessels; if it fa ils to do so 
the blockade becomes ineffective and legally void. In other words, if the blockading 
power permits some vessels to cross the blockade, while denying that ability to 
other vessels, it is not effectively enforcing the blockade. In the absence of an effec-
tive blockade, any interference with the navigational rights of vessels would be un-
lawful. Hence, if the Israeli government wishes to maintain the naval blockade of 
Gaza, it has no choice but to prevent all vessels from either entering or leaving the 
blockaded area. 
229 
Methods and Means of Naval Waif are in Non-International Armed Conflicts 
Under the international law of naval blockade, all vessels, irrespective of the flag 
they fly, must be prevented from entering or leaving the blockaded area. In this in-
stance, if they breach the blockade by crossing the blockade line twenty nautical 
miles off the Gaza coastline, or if they attempt to breach the blockade, they are lia-
ble to capture or to any other measure taken by blockading units to prevent a con-
tinuation of their voyage. lOS 
On some occasions it may be difficult to establish an attempt to breach the 
blockade. That is not the case with the "Gaza flotilla." The organizers had expressly 
stated their intent to breach the blockade and the vessels' approach to the block-
aded area constituted an attempted breach of blockade. Given the expressed intent 
and the approach of the vessels, the Israeli Defense Force units did not need to wait 
to act until the vessels were either close to the blockade line o r crossing it. Rather, 
they were entitled to take the necessary measures at a considerable dis tance because 
the attempt to breach the blockade was obvious. 106 
Vessels either breaching or attempting to breach a naval blockade must comply 
with all legitimate orders by the blockading power. If summoned to stop they may 
not contin ue their voyage nor attempt to escape. They are obligated to let a board-
ing team on the vessel and to allow the team to take control of the ship. Any act of 
escape or resistance may be overcome by the use of proportionate force, including, 
if necessary, the use of deadly force. 107 
Humanitarian considerations playa role in determining the lawfulness of a 
blockade. A naval blockade is unlawful if " the damage to the civilian population is, 
or may be expected to be, excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated from the blockade."los "Excessive" does not mean "exten-
sive." Applied to the blockade of the Gaza Strip, there can be no doubt that it has 
resulted in inconveniences for the civilian population, but certainly not in exces-
sive damage. In this context it is important to no te that the military advantage 
gained, Le., the prevention of the flow of arms and the entry of terrorists, is quite 
substantial. 
Moreover, the blockading power is obliged to provide fo r relief consignments 
if the civilian population of the blockaded area is no longer adequately provided 
with goods essential for its sUlvival, i.e., with food, water and medical supplies. 109 
The "Gaza flotilla" was allegedly on a purely h umanitarian mission to provide the 
civilian population in Gaza with such essential goods. It is immaterial whether this 
was true, whether the cargoes indeed consisted of essential goods only or whether 
the flotilla was only pursuing political and provocative goals. Even if the flotilla 
had been on a purely humanitarian mission it would have had no right to ap-
proach the Gaza coastline. Rather, the blockading power could prescribe "the 
technical arrangements, induding search, under which the relief consignments are 
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permitted."110 It is important to note that, in 2010, the Israeli government was pre-
pared to allow the shipment of the flotilla's cargo to Gaza under the condition that 
it was un10aded in an Israeli port and its distribution entrusted to the United Na-
tions. That proposal was well in accordance with the applicable law. The mere 
claim of pursuing humanitarian goals or to be a humanitarian organization does 
not give rise to a right to breach a blockade. Any refusal to accept reasonable tech-
nical arrangements offered by the blockading power and any continuation of the 
voyage without complying with the legitimate orders of the blockading power will 
enti tle the latter to take appropriate and proportionate measures, including the use 
of force, to prevent the vessels from entering the blockaded area. 
Conclusion 
It has been shown that the parties to a non-international armed conflict are not 
obliged to confine the armed hostilities to the land territory of the State and that 
they may make use of recognized methods and means of naval warfare. As long as 
the measures they take against each other have no detrimental impact on interna-
tional navigation and aviation there are no considerable legal obstacles. 
While there seems to be widespread agreemen t that neither party to a non-
international anned conflict is entitled to interfere with foreign shipping and avia-
tion in sea areas beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea, the State party to a 
non-international armed conflict continues to enjoy the right to enforce its do-
mestic law under the law of the sea. Moreover, it would be difficult to maintain 
that the definition of lawful military objectives that undoubtedly applies in non-
international armed conflicts ceases to be valid merely by reason of the geograph-
ical position of the target. Hence, foreign vessels and aircraft that contribute to 
the enemy's military action by, for example, providing targeting data are lawful 
targets even if they are located on the high seas or in international airspace. 
As regards measures short of attack, i.e., visit, search and capture, States seem to be 
prepared to tolerate such measures if taken by the State party to a non-international 
anned conflict, if vital security interests are at stake and if the interception measures 
are taken in the vicinity of the coast. Similar considerations may apply if the State 
party decides to establish and enforce a naval blockade. 
Notes 
1. SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPUCABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT 
S£A 73 (Louise Doswald·Bock N ., 1995) ( ~although the provisions of this Manual are primarily 
meant to apply to international armed conflicts at sea, this has intentionally not been expressly 
231 
Methods and Means of Naval Waif are in Non-International Armed Conflicts 
indicated .. . in order not to dissuade the implementation of these rules in non-international 
armed conflicts involving naval operations»). 
2. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUcrOF HOSTIUTIES UNDER THE LAw OF INTERNATIONAl 
ARMED CONFUcr 26-28 (2d ed. 2010). For the latter aspect, see Prosecutorv. Tadic, Case No. 
IT -94-1, Appeals Chamber Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Juris-
diction, 1 70 (In t'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) [hereinafter TadiCl. 
3. For an analysis of such ~amorphous situations," see DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 26. 
4. See, e.g., NOAM LUBELL, ExTRATERRITORIAL VSE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE 
AcrORS 103 (2010); Douglas Guilfoyle, The Mavi Marmara Incident and Blockade in Armed Con-
flict, 81 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 171, 186--87 (2011). 
5. Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government ofIsraei, HCJ 769f02, Judg-
ment (Dec. 13,2006),46 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 373 (2007), available tit http:// 
elyon l.coUTt.gov .ilJfiles_engf02f69Of007 fa34/0200769O.a34.pdf [hereinafter Public Committee 
against Torture]. 
6. This position is taken by Cassese, who maintains that Han armed conflict which takes 
place between an Occupying Power and rebel or insurgent groups . . . in an occupied territory 
amounts to an international armed conflict.» ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 420 (2d 
ed.2005). 
7. This is the position taken in the Gennan military manual. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF 
DEFENCE (Germany), H UMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFUcrS MANUAL (1992). However, 
in the forthcoming edition of the manual, there will be a separate section dealing with the law of 
non-international armed conflict. 
8. See, e.g., Amendment to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects, Doc. No. CCW/CONFIl II2 (Dec. 21, 2001). 
9. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(c), July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90. Additional ly, in 1993 the International Committee of the Red Cross stated that "ac-
cording to humanitarian law as it stands today, the notion of war crimes is limited to si tuations of 
international armed conflict." Some Preliminary Remarks by the International Committee of 
the Red Cross on the Setting up of an International Tribunal (Feb. 22, 1993), reprinted in 2 
VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAl FOR THE FORMER YUGOSu..VIA 391, 392 (1995). 
10. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 V.N.T.S. 31;Convention for the Ame-
lioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea 
art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.s.T. 3217, 75 V.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative 10 the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War art. 3,Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T.3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135;Convention Reialiveto the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.ST. 3516, 75 U.N.T.s. 
287. 
II. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 10 the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
12. OINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 27. 
13. Tadii, supra nOle 2. 
14. DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 28. 
15. PrOlocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.s. 3. 
16. Tadii, supra note 2. See also MICHAEl N. SCHMIIT, CHARLES H.B. GARRAWAY & YORAM 
DIN$TEIN, THE MANUAL ON THE LAw OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH 
232 
WolffHeintschell'on Heinegg 
COMMENTARY, 1.1.1 (2006) [hereinafterNlACMANUAL[ (~Non-internationalarmedconflicts 
are anned confrontations oc<:urring within the territory of a single State and in which the anned 
forces of no other State are engaged against the central government."). 
17. &e LESUE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFlIcr 343 n .1 (2000). 
18. [d. 
19. Admittedly, scholars disagree on whether recognition of belligerency is still a valid legal 
concept. For an analysis, see Yair M. Lootsteen, The Concept of Belligerency in International LAw, 
166 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 109 (2000). 
20. Nonnan J. Padelford, International LAw and the Spanish Civil War, 31 AMERiCAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 226 (1937); George A. Finch, Piracy in the Mediterrmlean, 31 
AMERiCAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 659 (1937). 
21. Nyon Arrangement, Sept. 14, 1937, 181 L.N.T.S. 135; Agreement Supplementary to the 
Nyon Arrangement, Sept. 17, 1937, 181 L.N .T.5. 149. For the text of the agreements and an anal-
ysis by L.F.E. Goldie, see 1937Geneva Agreement Supplementary to the NyonArrangemenr, in THE 
LAw Of NAVAL WARFARE 487-502 (Natalino Ronzitt i ed.,1988). 
22. Guilfoyle, supra note 4, at 192. 
23. D~cret 56/274, Journal Officiel (Mar. 17, 1956), at 2665. 
24. The exact figures are unclear. Some report that 4,775 ships were searched in the first year 
alone. See ROBIN R CHURCHIll & ALAN V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 217 (3d ed. 1999). 
25. Laurent Lucchini, Actes de COTl trainte Exercl.s par la France en Haute Mer au Gaur'S des 
Operations en A/gme, 1966 ANNUAlRE FRANc;AlS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 803. SeeaIso D.P. 
O'Connell , In ternational LAw and Contemporary Naval OperatioTlS, 44 BRiTISH YEARBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 19.36-39 (1970). 
26. Note that the distance was 50 kilometers, not 50 nautical miles. 
27. The Gennan Bilbew and the Bulgarian Chipka were visited in the English Channel, the 
German La.s Palmas twenty-two nautical miles south of Cape Vicent and the German Arcluum 
fifty-four nautical miles east of Gibraltar. 
28. See ROLF OTIMOLLER, DIE ANWENDUNG VON SEEKRiEGSRECHT IN MIUTARlSCHEN 
KONFlIKTEN SEIT 1945, at 137 (1978). 
29. O'Connell, supra note 25, at 37-39. 
30. Wary Of Sea Tigers, India tightens security, REDiFF INDIA ABROAD (May 14,2(07), http:// 
www.rediff.comfnewsJ2007/may/1 4Itte.htm. 
31. India Must Neutralise Sea Tigers, THE HINDU (Dec. 12,20(4), http://www.hindu.com/ 
2004/12/12/storiesJ2004121206020400.htm. 
32. Guilfoyle, supra note 4, at 193. 
33. Notice to Mariners No. 6/2008 (Aug. 13,2(08), http://en.moLgov.il/index.php?oprion 
=com_content&view=article&id=74:n062008&catid=17:noticetomariners&ltemid=12. 
34. Notice to Mariners No. 1/2009 Blockade of Gaza Strip (Jan. 6, 2009), http:// 
199.203.58.11IEN/index.php?option=com_content&View=article&id= 124:no 12009&catid= 17 
:noticetomariners&1 temid= 12. 
35. For the facts of what has become known as the ~flotilla incident," see U.N. Secretary-
General's Panel of Inquiry, Report on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Inddent, 83-93 (J uly 2011) 
(Geoffrey Palmer et al.), available at http://www.un.orglNewsJdhJinfocusfmiddle_eastl 
Gaza_Florilla_Panel_Report.pdf [hereinafter Palmer ReportJ. 
36. S.c. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17,2011). 
37. Libya: Nato intercepts boats laying mines outside Misurata, THE TELEGRAPH (United King-
dom) (Apr. 29, 2011), hnp:/lwww.telegraph.co.ukJneW'S/worldnewsiafricaandindianoceanilibyaJ 
8483805/Libya-Nato-intercepts-boats-Iaying-mines-outside-Misurata.html. 
233 
Methods and Means of Naval Waif are in Non-International Armed Conflicts 
38. See supra note 16 and text accompanying notes 12, 16. 
39. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, De<. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
(hereinafter LOS Convention). 
40. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 24, at 87-88, 90. 
41. Emphasis added. 
42. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 24, at 100. 
43. SAN REMo MANUAL, supra note 1,127. See also U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps & U.S. 
Coast Guard, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations 9.2.3, NWP 1· 
14M/MCWP 5·12.I/COMDTPUB P58oo.7A (2007), available at http://www.usnwc.edu/ 
getattachmenr!a9b8e92d-2c8d.4 779-9925-Odefea93325c! 1-I4M_O ul_2007)_(NWP (hereinaf. 
ter Commander's Handbook]. 
44. LOS Convention, supra note 39, arts. 44, 54. 
45. To "prevent infringement of customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws within its ter-
ritory or terri torial seas» or to ~punish infringement of ... [those] laws and regulations commit· 
ted wi thin its territory or territorial seas." 
46. Guilfoyle, supra note 4, at 193. 
47. SAN Rf.Mo MANUAL, supra note 1, 36. 
48. [d., 1 37. 
49. [d., 34, 35. 
SO. Id., 1 13.21. 
51. Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, 115 C.T.S. 1, reprinted in THE 
LAwS OF ARMED CONFLlCfS 1056 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman cds., 4th 00. 2004). 
52. Convention Relating to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into War-Ships, Oct. 18, 
1907,205 Consol. T.S. 319, reprinted in id. at 1066. 
53. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 4SO U.N.T.S. 82. 
54. See Commander's Handbook, supra note 43, 1 2.2.2. 
55. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICt RESEARCH, MANUAL ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAWS APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE 1 17(a) (2009), available Ilt 
http://ihlresearch.orglamw/HPCR%20ManuaLpdf (~Only military aircraft, ind uding UCAVs, 
are entitled to engage in attacks."). The commentary indicates, "Rule 17 (a) does not apply in 
non-international armed conflict. States are more likely to employ law·enforcement and other 
State aircraft during these conflicts. It is not in contravention with the law of international armed 
if such aircraft conduct combat functions.~ [d. at 101. 
There is a very limited exception in those instances when the States parties to a non-international 
armed conflict are undertaking p rize measures against enemy merchant vessels or civilian air· 
craft. In those cases. only warships may exercise belligerent rights. 
56. See infra Part IV. 
57. See NIAC MANUAL, supra note 16, 1.1.2,2.1.1. Although members of the State's 
armed forces are lawfui targets under the law of non· international armed conflict, members of 
the dissident armed forces or an organized armed group who target them do not have combatant 
immunity and are subject to prosecution under the State's domestic criminal law. 
58. NIlS MElZER, INTERNATIONAL COMMITIEE OFTHE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUID· 
ANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECt PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
H UMANITARIAN LAw 27 (2009). 
59. Id. at 34. 
60. [d. 
6 1. Except for medical and religious personnel, who may not be targeted unless they take an 
active part in hostilities. NlAC MANUAL, supra note 16,11.1.2. 
234 
WolffHeintschell'on Heinegg 
62. I CUSfOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw 21 (Jean·Marie Henckaerts & 
Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter C1HLJ. 
63. NlAC MANUAL,supra note 16, 2.1.1.1,2.1.1 .2. 
64. Id., 1 1.1.4. See also CIHL, supra note 62, at 30-31. 
65. See NlAC MANUAL, supra note 16, 11.1.4.3. 
66. Such attacks are lawful under the intemationallaw of non-international armed conflict, 
but, as with attacks on members of the armed forces, those who carry out the attacks are subject 
to prosecution under the State's domestic law. See supra note 57. 
67. NlAC MANUAL, supra note 16, 2.1.1.1 ; CIHL, supra note 62, at 5-8, 32-34. 
68. See NIAC MANUAL, supra note 16,11.2.2. 
69. Id., 1 1.1.3; CIHL, supra note 62, at 19. 
70. See NlAC MANUAL, supra note 16, 11 .1 5 . 
71. See supra Part I.F. 
72. S.c. Res. 1973, supra note 36, 1 6. 
73. LOS Convention, supra note 39, art. 25(3) . 
74. See Commander's Handbook, supra note 43, 1 9.2. See also HOWARD S. LEVIE, MINE 
WARFARE AT SEA (1992); Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, The International Law of Mine Warfare 
at Sea, 23 ISRAEL YEARBQOKON HUMAN RIGHTS 53 (1993) . 
75. See NlAC MANUAL, supra note 16, 12.1 .1.3. 
76. Id.,12.2.1 .i. 
77. [d., 1 2.2.1.2. 
78. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 1, 82. 
79. See Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 74, at 62. 
80. SAN REMo MANUAL, supra note 1, 103. See also Guilfoyle, supra note 4, at 198-200. 
81. ClHL, supra note 62, at 148. 
82. Id. at 149. 
83. Some prefer a comprehensive approach and tend to equate the natural environment 
with an Kecosystem." Accordingly, components of the natural environment, such as flora, 
fauna, the lithosphere or the atmosphere, would only be covered by the term if they interact in 
a way that they may be considered part of an interdependent and mutually influencing system 
of diverse components of the natural environment. In contrast, others are prepared to con· 
sider components of the natural environment to be specially protected by the law of armed 
conflict, irrespective of their interdependence with other components. The only common de· 
nominator is that the term "natural environment" does not cover man-made components of 
the environment. 
84. Guilfoyle, supra note 4, at 193-94. 
85. See supra text accompanying notes 64-66. 
86. Nyon Arrangement, supra note 21, pmbL 
87. O'Connell, supra note 25, at 38-39. 
88. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Ckcupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 20041.C.J. 136, 1 139 (July9) ("The Court also notes that Israel exe-rcises con· 
trol in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and that ... the threat which it regards as justifying the 
construction of the wall originates within, and not outside, that territory. The situation is thus 
different from that contemplated by Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 
(2001) .... Consequently, the Court concludes that Article 51 of the Charter has no relevance in 
thiscase.n ). 
235 
Methods and Means of Naval Waif are in Non-International Armed Conflicts 
89. See Wolff Heintschei von Heinegg, Blockade, in MAx PlANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA Of PUBLIC 
Im-£RNATIONAL LAW (Rildiger Wolfrwn 00., 2010), hnp-J/www.mpepiloom/subscnber _artide?script 
=yes&id=/epil/entriesllaw-9780 19923169O-e2528crerno=3&author=Heintso:he1 von Heinegg Wolff. 
9(). See supra Part LA. 
91. Guilfoyle, supra note 4, at 217. 
92. Id. 
93. It is interesting to note that a 2009 report submitted to the Human Rights Council does 
not contain a legal analysis under the law of naval blockade. See U.N. Human Rights Council, 
Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Terri tories, Report of the United Nations 
Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, U.N. Doc. A/H RCII2I48 (Sept. 25, 2(09) (Richard 
Goldstone). 
94. Guilfoyle, supra note 4, at 178-91. 
95. For the concept of desuetude, see, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, HI)W In ternational Law Dies, 
93 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 939 (2005) . 
96. See YORAM DINSl"EIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW Of BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 276-
83 (2009) . 
97. See HCJ 9132/07 AJ·Bassiouni v. Prime Minister , 12 [Jan. 30, 2008] (unpublished), avail-
able at http://www.mfa.gov.ilJNRJrdonlyresl938CCD2E-89C7-4E77-B071-56772DFF79CGO/ 
HCJGazaelectricity.pdf. 
98. Public Committee against Torture, supra note 5. 
99. Jacob Tu rkel et al. , I The Public Commission to Examine the Ma ri t ime Incident 
of 31 May 2010, 41 (2011). available at http://turkel-commillee.gov.iUfilesfwordocsll 
870n0021Ienglish.pdf. 
100. Id." 44. 
101. Palmer Report, supra note 35, 173. 
102. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note I, "u193-104;Commander's Handbook, supra note 43, 1 
7.7. 
103. For the relationship between the law of the sea and the law of naval warfare, see Wolff 
Heintschel von Heinegg, The United Nations Conventi01J on the Law of the Sea and Maritime 
Security Operations, 48 GERMAN YEARBOOK Of INTERNATIONAL LAW 151 (2005). 
104. Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, supra note 51, 1 4; Declaration Concerning the 
Laws of Naval War art. 2, Feb. 26, 1909,208 Consol. T.5. 338, reprinted in THE LAwS Of ARMED 
CONFLICl"S, supra note 51, at 1113 (never in force); SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 1,195; 
Commander's Handbook, supra note 43,,7.7.2.3. 
105. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note I, 67(a), 98,146(0. See also Declaration Concerning 
the Laws of Naval War, supra note 105, art. 20; HeinlSChei von Heinegg, supra note 89, '1/141-48. 
106. The boarding of the Matti Marmara and the other vessels in the flotilla occurred approxi. 
mately 72 nautical miles at sea. Palmer Report, supra note 35,1 I. 
107. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note I, 67(a), 146(f);Commander's Handbook,supra note 
43,,7.10. 
108. SAN REMOMANUAL,supra note I, 102(b) . 
109. Id." 103; Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 89, 49-52. 
110. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 1,1 103(b); Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 90, 
50-51. 
236 
